Can China remake regional order? Contestation with India over the Belt and Road Initiative by Chan, L-H
 
18 | P a g e  
 
 
Can China Remake Regional Order? 
Contestation with India over the Belt and Road Initiative   
Lai-Ha Chan, UTS   
Abstract  
This article argues that China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) can be understood via the lens 
of regional ordering, whereby China attempts to redefine the shared goals and values for the 
region of Eurasia and to socialize regional states into the new values in order to have their 
consent to its leadership. The success of this strategy would then depend, to a large extent, on 
how its target regional audience reacts to the order-remaking strategy and practices. Taking an 
‘eye of the beholder’ perspective, this article focuses on Indian perceptions of China’s order-
remaking strategy in South Asia. It posits that India uses the ‘debt trap diplomacy’ narrative to 
delegitimize China’s infrastructure investment activities based on state capitalism, which have 
been perceived as a move to upend the status quo and challenge New Delhi’s traditional 
leadership in the region. To counter China’s growing influence, India is networking with other 
like-minded countries to promote a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ through groupings such as the 
Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, the Quad, Malabar exercises, and increasing political and 
economic bonds with the ASEAN countries. A serious contest over order between China and 
India in the Indian Ocean is looming on the horizon.  
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China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), composed of the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and the 
‘Twenty-first-century Maritime Silk Road’, has emerged as President Xi Jinping’s signature 
foreign policy initiative. Since 2013 the literature on the rationales for setting up this mega 
infrastructure project has expanded exponentially.1 Authors have discussed China’s economic 
and commercial motives, such as China’s need to export its production overcapacity in order 
to arrest domestic economic slowdown.2 For others, great power rivalry has had a role to play 
in China’s decision to undertake the BRI. It serves as a response to US attempts to maintain its 
primacy in Asia, trying to carve out a regional security space in Eurasia in order to mitigate the 
American threat coming from the east of China, namely the Asia-Pacific region.3  
 
In line with the soft-balancing argument which this author has put forward, 4  this article 
advances an assertion that the BRI can be broadly understood as a regional (re)ordering project. 
This ordering project aims to contest or constrain the US as the incumbent hegemon softly and 
to negotiate new rules and norms and provision of (regional) public goods to Eurasian states in 
order to have their consent to China’s leadership. In other words, the strategic objective of the 
BRI is to remake the regional order. The most essential question for studying order-(re)building 
is how durable and stable the new regional order is. A durable and stable regional order is often 
one in which the leading state has influential followers which accept the rules of the game as 
set by the leader.5 Hence, the success of the BRI would depend, to a large extent, on how its 
target regional audience reacts to the order-(re)building strategy and practices. Do they 
acquiesce to or reject this Chinese-led regional order?  
 
The article proceeds in five major steps. First, it outlines the theoretical framework of 
international order rebuilding in which both contestation and legitimation play significant roles. 
Second, it discusses the legitimation role of the BRI for China, focusing on the norms, rules 
and institutional arrangements of Chinese state capitalism. The Chinese narrative of ‘win-win’ 
cooperation and partnership based on enhanced connectivity, however, spurs a competition 
between China and its regional arch-rival, India,6 for regional leadership. The third section 
illustrates India’s strategic concerns and efforts to balance against China which makes South 
Asia a contentious region in China’s outward push to transform regional order. The fourth 
section discusses India’s counter-narrative, namely the ‘debt-trap diplomacy’, and the most 
contentious geo-economic issues of China’s BRI projects in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the 
Maldives. To delegitimize China’s order building project, India frames China as a threatening 
‘other’ because of the alleged predatory state capitalist practices. The fifth section is devoted 
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to the discussion of the contestation between China and India’s competing regional-ordering 
projects. To counter China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean, India is networking with 
other liberal-minded countries to promote a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ through the 
multilateral means of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, the Quad, Malabar exercises and its 
increasing political and economic bonds with the ASEAN countries. Finally, the article 
concludes that a serious contest over regional order between China and India looms large. 
 
Theoretical framework: international order, contestation and legitimacy  
 
International order, according to Hedley Bull, is a pattern of international activity that sustains 
the elementary goals of the society of states. It is formed by a group of states that share certain 
common interests and values and participate in the maintenance of international institutions.7 
This rules-based interaction is underpinned by an intersubjective consensus on the basic goals 
of international society as well as the means of achieving the goals. Bially Mattern refers to 
international order as ‘a relationship among specific states that produces and reinforces shared 
understandings of expectations and behaviours with respect to each other’.8 The key question 
for the study of the durability of an international order is: who has the authority to define the 
shared goals and values for the rest of the international society? The United States has been the 
major driving force behind the formation of the liberal international order (LIO) since the end 
of World War II. Even though the application of liberal norms, rules and institutions has not 
been uniform across the globe and the LIO is primarily a regional phenomenon, dominant in 
North America, Western Europe, Japan, South Korea (since the 1990s), Australia and New 
Zealand only, the shared ideas undergirding the LIO have been framed as universal. The US-
led LIO rests on several pillars: a commitment to open multilateralism; embedded liberalism 
in which the domestic open economy is ‘managed’ so as to provide the working class with 
protection of economic and social security; the values of liberal democracy and the rule of law; 
and a special relationship among Western liberal democratic states.9 Ideally the liberal powers 
take it as their mission to extend the LIO to the non- or less-liberal parts of the world. 
 
Common to all rising powers is, however, that with a sense of dissatisfaction with the dominant 
LIO, they show varying degrees of revisionist motives and goals and intend to break the 
prevailing ‘rules of the game’. They often try to contest the existing international or regional 
order in remaking the order. However, it is worth noting that it is one thing to contest the 
prevailing order to remake an order; it is another to make the new order durable and stable. A 
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stable, durable and binding international order comes into being only when both leading and 
secondary states broadly and mutually accept and settle the dominant norms and rules of a 
particular order rather than reliance on coercion.  Through bargaining and negotiation processes, 
the incumbent hegemon and the hegemonic challenger try to garner political support from 
secondary states and other non-great power states in order to defend or unsettle the prevailing 
norms, rules and institutional arrangements. A durable and stable order is produced not only 
by balance of power but also by normative forces and endowed with legitimacy (i.e. gaining 
secondary states’ consent to new norms, rules and arrangements).10 In short, rule-breaking 
order-remaking behaviours therefore demand legitimation through a justificatory discourse and 
recognised social practices in order to be widely acknowledged and accepted.11 The quest for 
social legitimacy and effective legitimation features prominently for China, a rapidly re-
emerging yet non-Western and non-democratic power which endeavours to recover the past 
glory days, a typical revisionist goal. While seeking to modify the status quo in its favour in a 
bid to rise in the established pecking order, a re-emerging China is attentive to legitimation in 
order not to be seen by its target audiences as both an adversary and a major source of 
significant threat to the existing world order, which will otherwise bring about a collective 
mobilisation against its ascendancy.  
 
On the basis of this theoretical framework, the following section will discuss how China 
unfolds its regional order construction project by contesting the prevailing LIO, especially the 
pro-market norms and practices as well as legitimising the Chinese ones. 
 
China’s BRI: Legitimising China’s Economic Leadership  
 
To counteract both US ‘pivot to Asia’ policy and a ‘New Silk Road’ initiative unveiled by then-
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in November 2011,12 China adopted a Westward policy, the 
‘Marching West (西進)’ strategy, and cooperate with the countries in its west to generate a 
strategically friendly environment. The first immediate strategic objectives of the BRI in 2013 
was to address the negative effects US ‘pivot to Asia’ policy might bring to China and to act 
as an ‘enforceable policy’ to promote economic and security cooperation in the Eurasian 
region.13 Later on, it has been designed to serve as an institutional means for China to transform 
the regional order in Eurasia to its liking. Therefore, the strategic objective of the BRI could 
be seen as ‘killing two birds with one stone’. It not only serves as a soft-balancing strategy 
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towards the US ‘pivot to Asia’, but also re-constitutes the Eurasian order in order to form and 
strengthen China’s regional sphere of influence. William Callahan summarizes succinctly the 
grand strategy of the BRI as “us[ing] economic leverage to build a Sino-centric ‘community of 
shared destiny’ in Asia, which in turn will make China a normative power that sets the rules of 
the game for global governance”.14 
 
The success of the highly ambitious and visible BRI, worth up to $1 trillion and running across 
continents, would have real consequences for both Xi Jinping as China’s supreme leader, and 
China as a re-emerging power. Because of its gigantic scale, it inevitably generates rivalry with 
the US, fuelling further pressure for legitimation. To mobilise public support in foreign 
countries for the BRI, legitimation from China is deemed necessary. As argued by Ronald 
Krebs, narratives ‘channel [political contest], privileging particular courses of action and 
impeding the legitimation of others’.15 The dominant Chinese legitimising narrative is ‘win-
win’ cooperation and partnership based on enhanced connectivity.16 This narrative is closely 
tied to two larger historical narratives, the ‘century of national humiliation’ and the ‘Chinese 
dream’, whereby China is framed as a victim of Western imperialist aggrandisement and 
invasion for more or less 100 years in 1839-1945 and it is high time for the Chinese nation to 
achieve its rejuvenation and for China to be restored to its rightful place in the hierarchical 
international order.17 With these inter-related narratives, China defines its identity by othering 
the West; it represents the West as aggressive and expansionist powers and itself as a non-
Western, re-emerging benign hegemon. To validate and enact this identity of a re-emerging 
benign hegemon, China is keen to execute its regional order-building project and wants to 
persuade its audiences that its current approach to international development, embodied in the 
BRI, is intrinsically non-colonial, non-exploitative and mutually beneficial.  
 
However, as alluded in the theoretical framework above, it is one thing to undertake regional 
order-building, it is another thing to make China’s ordering project socially acceptable to 
affected regional actors. We need to examine how China ‘sells’ its project to South Asian states 
and how regional states perceive China’s BRI. South Asia is chosen as the primary case study 
here because the region was the first area that featured prominently in China’s ‘Marching West’ 
strategy to counteract US influence. Additionally, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(CPEC) is deemed the ‘flagship project’ of the BRI. Strategic thinkers in Beijing have pointed 
out that, compared with the countries in Southeast Asia, none of the countries to the west of 
China, with the exception of India, have any direct conflicts with Beijing. According to them, 
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China is well-placed position to collaborate with them in geo-economics and geopolitics.18 
However, as Raffaello Pantucci claims, the region is ‘where Beijing’s miscalculations 
regarding India have created conflict with a regional power that has the capability and desire 
to disrupt China’s outward push.’19  Therefore, it is fair to assume that China encounters 
mounting challenges from India in advancing its BRI activities.  What normative disputes lie 
behind the BRI? 
 
The BRI as the Epitome of State Capitalism 
The BRI embodies a Chinese state-led strategy to advocate its own vision of economic 
governance that emphasizes the positive role of large-scale project aid, undertaken by state-
owned enterprises in the form of tied aid. In other words, the essence of the Chinese lending 
epitomized by the BRI is state capitalism. Conventional wisdom often has it that China is a 
strong proponent of non-conditionality.20 Mattlin and Nojonen, however, point out that China’s 
lending by state-owned policy banks is in fact full of ‘conditions’. The difference between 
Western countries and China may simply rest with the fact that they adopt different forms of 
conditionality: while the former emphasizes certain binding political conditions, e.g. good 
governance and democracy, the latter attaches non-political conditions to its development 
assistance packages.21 Tied aid rests on non-political conditions that recipient countries have 
to purchase Chinese products or to use China’s contracting service or labour. Well before the 
advent of the BRI, about 70% of China’s infrastructure development aid to Africa was used to 
buy goods or services from Chinese, mostly state-owned, companies. The rest was theoretically 
passed on to local firms, many of which were, however, joint ventures with Chinese 
companies.22 This is echoed by another study which points out that almost all of the Chinese 
aid packages to African countries have stipulated that Chinese workers and machinery be 
used.23 
 
Behind the façade of development aid, China does not promote open-market access to its loans 
and grants; instead they are embedded in a China-dominated tied aid architecture with goods 
and services provided by well-connected Chinese state-owned enterprises. The BRI projects in 
South Asia, as shown in Pakistan, the Maldives and Sri Lanka, are vivid examples. Several 
informants in Islamabad admitted that there was no open bidding for the contracts for the 
projects financed by Chinese grants. Chinese state-owned companies received the project 
contracts directly from their government, and would produce goods and services to Pakistan.24 
While it is therefore often open to speculation as to whether China’s state-owned enterprises 
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pursue commercial profits or strategic interests on behalf of their government, China’s ‘win-
win’ narrative emphasises that the BRI has met the insatiable demand for infrastructural 
investment in Eurasia, and that China is the engine of regional economic growth.  
 
State-owned enterprises have long been key players in China’s economic development. 
According to a Gavekal Dragonomics research report, as of 2015, the SOE sector in China has 
accounted for roughly 30% of the country’s GDP.25 In addition, between 70% and 80% of these 
SOEs are in the sector of infrastructure investment.26 This type of development model is not 
unique in the world. After World War II, East Asian countries of South Korea and Taiwan had 
adopted a similar state-led development model whereby the state played a significant role in 
planning and directing national economic development during their economic high-growth 
phases. However, the number of SOEs has dropped significantly since their political transition 
towards a more liberal democratic system in the 1980s and 1990s respectively. By contrast, 
even after 40 years of supposedly pro-market economic reforms, China’s SOEs still play a 
predominant role in its economy and is the largest in the world in both absolute and relative 
terms.27  
There is little doubt that the Chinese government uses subsidies, preferential loans (offered by 
state-owned banks) and industrial policy prevalently to cultivate a group of select enterprises 
to be national champions in select fields in order to build a wealthy and powerful state. At issue 
is whether Chinese state capitalism, embedded under the BRI, represents a threatening ‘other’ 
to South Asian states, and whether China, with the support of state-led BRI projects, manages 
to cultivate powerful followers to its regional order-remaking project. The role of India is 
pivotal to China’s order-remaking and legitimation strategy. 
 
India’s Strategic Pushback: Territorial Integrity  
 
China’s BRI started as a policy measure to enhance its own security by soft-balancing an 
imminent threat from the US. However, China’s increasing infrastructure investment in South 
Asia has complicated the balance of power in the region. China’s economic power has 
successfully wooed some of the states in the region to turn their diplomatic relations closer to 
Beijing than to New Delhi. Feeling threatened by China’s strategic encirclement, India has not 
participated in the BRI, and was conspicuously absent from high-profile international fora on 
the BRI held by China in May 2017 and April 2019. One day before the first BRI international 
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forum in Beijing in May 2017, India issued a strongly worded statement, explaining India’s 
core concern about the BRI. The statement reiterated India’s concern over its territorial 
integrity and China’s geopolitical influence in the region. It warned of ‘unsustainable debt 
burden’ being created by the BRI; and stated that New Delhi would not accept a project that 
ignored its sovereign integrity and that ‘[c]onnectivity projects must be pursued in a manner 
that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity’.28  
 
The BRI is perceived by New Delhi as a Chinese strategic design ‘to continue establishing the 
strategic agglomeration over India’.29  A commonly held perception about CPEC in India is 
that it is China’s balancing act ‘against India with the support for Pakistan’.30 Although India 
and China have many common interests – both are members of BRICS and the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation, and the two largest-shareholders of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank – they are often at loggerheads over border delineation and national 
sovereignty, as well as competition for regional leadership. Aksai Chin in the eastern part of 
Kashmir has long been a disputed territory between the two countries. Qing China began in the 
mid-1890s to claim it as its territory whereas Britain failed to have China’s endorsement of its 
proposal of 1899 to divide Aksai Chin between Britain and China.31  In the 1950s China 
constructed a road in Aksai Chin, linking Xinjiang with western Tibet.32 The territorial dispute 
was one of the causes of the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and China has since then retained the 
occupation of Aksai Chin.33 The war with China in 1962 has had significant impact on India’s 
foreign policy. Despite Nehru’s long-cherished foreign policy doctrine of nonalignment during 
the Cold War era – being ‘nonaligned’ with none of the two superpowers – the border war had 
subsequently driven India into a dependency on the Soviet Union for its military weapons 
supply. In addition, that war also laid the basis for China-Pakistan cooperation in the 
succeeding years, which was and is still perceived as a containment against India in the 
region.34 Because CPEC passes through Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, India 
is leery of China’s creeping presence and influence in Kashmir through CPEC.35 During an 
India-China strategic diplomatic dialogue in Beijing in February 2017, Foreign Secretary of 
India, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, bluntly stated that:  
 
‘The fact [is] that China-Pakistan Economic Corridor … violates Indian 
sovereignty because it runs through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) … the 
issue for us is a sovereignty issue’.36   
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India feels threatened not only by Chinese investment in and use of Gwadar and Jiwani, but 
also by border conflict in the other part of the country. In June-August 2017 China and India 
faced a military stand-off in the Doklam area (known as Donglang in China), a territory claimed 
by China and India’s ally, Bhutan, and where the Bhutan-China-India borders meet. Amid the 
military standoff at Doklam, the most complex week-long trilateral Malabar naval exercise 
among the United States, Japan and India, since its inception, was held at the Bay of Bengal in 
July.37  Although India downplayed the timing of the exercise and maintained that it ‘has 
nothing to do’ with the military standoff between China and India at Doklam,38 it was the 
largest naval exercise in the region in more than two decades, and was deemed as a balancing 
response to China’s recent assertiveness in the Indian Ocean and the increasing tensions 
between India and China.39  
 
India’s Delegitimation Pushback: The ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy’ Narrative 
 
Apart from territorial integrity, another Indian concern about the BRI is that Beijing might use 
this initiative to undertake ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ to exert undue influence in its ‘natural’ sphere 
of influence and challenge New Delhi’s traditional dominance in its own immediate backyard. 
Debt trap is referred to the damaging situation in which ‘a state has to spend much of its earning 
from trade on servicing its external debts rather than on economic and social development.’40 
Overborrowing and overlending are two sides of the same coin. While China frames it 
normatively as a non-colonial power and a development partners to other developing states, 
India takes the lead – and is followed by the US – in articulating a countervailing ‘neo-colonial’ 
‘debt-trap diplomacy’ narrative to delegitimise the Chinese ordering project.41 In the Indian 
counter-narrative, the purpose of the BRI is to enlarge China’s sphere of political and economic 
influence and is little more than a ‘colonial enterprise’.42 While China claims that the BRI 
promotes economic interdependence, quite a lot of Chinese-funded infrastructure projects in 
South Asia are operational or commercial failures, generating little profit. Consequently, the 
South Asian debtor states cannot afford to repay the loans. Since 2014, China’s trade surplus 
with the Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have grown rapidly. They are accordingly burdened 
with mounting external debts.43 New Delhi has had growing concerns over the negative impact 
of Chinese economic statecraft on its security and its dominant position in South Asia. India is 
wary that China’s BRI will aggravate its neighbouring states’ balance of payment crisis, which 
will eventually force them to accommodate Beijing’s security and foreign policy interests in 
the region. For example, in the UN Human Rights Council in July 2019 both Pakistan and Sri 
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Lanka supported Beijing’s ‘counter-terrorism and deradicalization’ policy towards the 
Uyghurs in Xinjiang.44 
 
The debt-trap narrative has drawn the attention of policy analysts to the public debt 
implications of the BRI for recipient countries. Three researchers at the Center for Global 
Development (CGD) in Washington, DC identified eight countries, among 68, to be vulnerable 
to ‘debt stress’ as a result of receiving BRI financing. They would likely be suffering more 
than the rest of the 60 countries from debt distress due to BRI-related financing. Seemingly, 
eight countries only constitute a minority, but the geographical distribution of them is a matter 
of concern for India. Two of the eight focus countries are in South Asia: Pakistan and the 
Maldives. In 2016, public and publicly guaranteed debt in the Maldives accounted for 65.7% 
of its GDP whereas the same debt-to-GDP ratio for Pakistan in the same year was 70.0%. A 
major source of Pakistan’s debt distress is the relatively high interest rates – up to 5% – charged 
by Chinese lenders.45  
 
Pakistan  
Pakistan has sought financial bailouts from both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
its allies in the Middle East after signing up to the $63-billion CPEC. CPEC, dubbed as the 
‘Marshall Plan for Pakistan’ and portrayed as the ‘flagship project’ of the BRI, commenced in 
2015. When Imran Khan took office in August 2018, his government blamed the previous 
Sharif government for granting China ‘too favourable’ terms on many projects. His commerce 
minister even vowed to suspend all CPEC projects until a review is completed. Other political 
groups, especially those with local support in smaller provinces in Pakistan, expressed concern 
over Pakistan being turned into an ‘economic colony’ of China.46 
 
Pakistan’s fiscal vulnerability deteriorated in January 2018 when the Trump administration 
suspended security aid of $1.3 billion a year to it after the President’s accusation of Pakistan’s 
leaders of ‘nothing but lies and deceit’.47 When Pakistan was facing a debt repayment crisis, 
which stood at $12 billion in November 2018, it sought financial assistance from Beijing again. 
Hoping to be given $6 billion in financial assistance, Islamabad was disappointed with an offer 
of $2.5 billion in loans only. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have allegedly 
committed to extending credit lines of up to $12 billion – $6 billion from each of them – to 
Pakistan. Simultaneously Pakistan negotiated with the IMF for a bailout and agreed to a 
structural adjustment programme with it, the 13th since 1988, in exchange for a $6-billion loan 
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in May 2019.48 As early as 2016, the IMF had warned Islamabad of the repayment obligations 
that would come with the CPEC projects, even though the investment might help lift the 
country’s GDP.49 The IMF package included the neoliberal demands for increasing Pakistan’s 
taxation and having market-determined exchange and interest rates and the more controversial 
installation of IMF’s ‘own men’ into Pakistan’s government. Accordingly, Reza Baqir, former 
IMF mission chief, was appointed the governor of the State Bank of Pakistan and Abdul Hafeez 
Shaikh, who worked for both the IMF and the World Bank, appointed advisor to the Prime 
Minister on finance.50 
 
The Maldives 
The Maldives, formerly a British colony until 1965, has maintained close relations with India 
for decades but recently is viewed as a potential South Asian state to be locked into a Chinese 
debt trap. The archipelagic state of 427,000 people was not a priority in China’s foreign 
relations before the Obama administration’s ‘pivot to Asia’ policy. Until late 2011, China did 
not have any in-residence ambassador to Malé. However, the geostrategic importance of the 
Maldives lies with its geographic proximity to international sea-lanes where two-thirds of the 
world’s oil and half of China’s container shipments pass. In addition, the country is only 700 
km from India’s Lakshadweep island chain and about 1,200 km from the Indian mainland.51 
Over the past few years, China’s investment in the Maldives has increased notably and its trade 
surplus with the Maldives more than doubled in three years (from US$103 million in 2014 to 
US$295 million in 2017). The archipelagic country signed a contract with a Chinese state-
owned firm to upgrade its international airport in Malé during Xi Jinping’s visit in 2014, a 
project which was originally contracted to India’s GMR Infrastructure under Mohamed 
Nasheed’s tenure (2008-2012) but was terminated by Abdulla Yameen (2013-2018). 52 
Criticizing the Maldivian decision, India warned that ‘to terminate the contract with GMR 
without due consultation with the company or efforts at arbitration provided for under the 
agreement sends a very negative signal to foreign investors and the international community’.53 
Nevertheless, since then, China has helped the archipelago in various mega-infrastructure 
projects, such as building a bridge linking Malé to Hulhulé Island and a 1,000-apartment 
housing project on reclaimed land on Hulhumalé, which itself is an artificial island.54 Malé also 
signed 12 different agreements with China, including the country’s first free trade agreement 
(FTA) and memorandum in participating the BRI during Yameen’s visit to Beijing in 
December 2017. Currently 70% of the archipelago’s foreign debt is owed to China.55 What 
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made India’s hackles rise was Yameen’s decision to accept ‘goodwill visits’ by three Chinese 
naval vessels in August 2017.56 
 
In February 2018, the government of the Maldives declared the state of emergency after the 
Supreme Court overturned criminal convictions against nine of Yameen’s opponents and 
ordered to release political prisoners and re-instate disqualified parliamentarians. Instead of 
obeying the Court’s decision, Yameen arrested two of the judges and sent troops to surround 
the Court. Fearful of China’s attempts to lock his country in a ‘debt trap’, Nasheed, who was 
in exile in Colombo, Sri Lanka, called for India’s military intervention to resolve the Maldivian 
political crisis. On the other hand, Yameen sent envoys to China, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to 
seek political support for his government. As shown in an opinion article in Global Times, a 
newspaper published by the People’s Daily corporation, Beijing has tactically sided with 
Yameen and warned that China would oppose outside interference; it said, ‘if India one-sidedly 
sends troops to the Maldives, China will take action to stop New Delhi’.57   Most of the 
opposition party’s senior leaders were charged with acts of terrorism, which had effectively 
made them ineligible for the forthcoming presidential election. An opposition party alliance 
agreed in June to nominate Ibrahim Mohamed Solih to run in the election. During the electoral 
campaign Solih vowed to review the Chinese projects committed by Yameen. Fears of political 
crisis eased in September when Yameen conceded defeat to Solih in the election. Warm ties 
with India began to restore afterwards. India felt satisfied with the decisive victory of Solih’s 
Maldivian Democratic Party in the parliamentary elections in April 2019.58  
 
Sri Lanka  
The most controversial part of China’s BRI in Sri Lanka is the Hambantota port in the south of 
the island state.59 Originally the Sri Lankan government under Mahinda Rajapaksa (2005-
2015) offered the project to India but the latter declined.60 China agreed to finance the $1.5-
billion project through three phases. With an initial estimated investment of $361 million, 
ultimately totalling $508 million, the first phase began in 2008 and became operational in 2010. 
China’s state-owned Export-Import (EXIM) Bank funded 85% of the first phase at a relatively 
high interest rate of 6.3%, and the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) funded the additional 
15%. This first phase included the construction of the basic port and other facilities for 
shipbuilding, bunkering, ship repairing, and crew changing. The second phase commenced in 
November 2012 and has largely been completed at an estimated cost of $810 million; it 
 
18 | P a g e  
 
involved the construction of berths; a feeder container terminal; an artificial island; a cofferdam; 
and other yards. The port’s entrance channel was deepened from -16 m to -17 m. The Rajapaksa 
government was not able to see the third phase unfold, as he was defeated in the 2015 
elections.61 
  
It is widely alleged that the succeeding Sirisena government (2015-2019) found it unable to 
pay back the loans, it in 217 handed over the port to a Chinese state-owned enterprise, China 
Merchants Port Holdings, on a 99-year lease in order to write off a debt of $1.1 billion.62 It is, 
however, counter-argued that the lease was not a debt-equity swap with Sri Lanka still being 
obliged to repay the loans obtained from the Export-Import Bank of China. The foreign 
exchange acquired from the lease was instead used to tackle the country’s balance of payment 
crisis arising out of sluggish growth in exports and foreign direct investment.63 
 
Sri Lanka’s the other major infrastructure project, Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, 
dubbed ‘the world’s emptiest international airport’, was also in the red. Mattala, located only 
20 km away from Hambantota port, was built in 2009. Of its total construction cost of $209 
million, $190 million (91%) was provided by the Export-Import Bank of China through a 
concessionary loan. As the losses of the airport began to mount, the Sri Lankan government 
intended to sell it. India was concerned that it might become China’s air force base and offered 
to take over the airport in 2017. In July 2018 Sri Lanka announced that the airport would be 
operated by India in a Sri Lanka-India joint venture.64 Also, much to the dismay of India, Sri 
Lanka granted docking rights to Chinese submarines in its Colombo port in November 2014. 
The Sirisena government, which came to power in 2015, did not give a similar permission in 
2017.65 However, the return of the pro-China Rajapaksa brothers to power in November 2019, 
with Gotabaya as the President and Mahinda as the Prime Minister, has alarmed India. In 
visiting New Delhi in February 2020, Mahinda Rajapaksa defended that the debt his country 
owed to China amounted to only 12% of the total external debt and that the Chinese funds were 
used for developing infrastructure. He blamed the previous Sirisena government for handing 
over Hambantota to reduce the debt. 66  Nevertheless, whether the Mahinda Rajapaksa 
government borrowed excessively from the Chinese bank to construct the port when his 
country’s public finance had been in dire condition is open to dispute.67. 
 
India’s countervailing narrative tries to refute the Chinese legitimation strategy by framing 
China’s external behaviour as little different from the European imperialist powers in the past. 
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The Indian academic Brahma Chelleney has argued, ‘If states are saddled with onerous levels 
of debts as a result [of the BRI investment], their financial woes only aid China’s neocolonial 
designs’ (emphasis added)68; ‘as Hambantota [in Sri Lanka] shows, China is now establishing 
its own Hong Kong-style neocolonial arrangements’ and ‘the BRI is essentially an imperial 
project that aims to bring to fruition the mythical Middle Kingdom’ (emphases added).69  
Neelam Deo and Amit Bhandari of Gateway House (the Indian Council on Global Relations) 
expressed their concern over the high cost of BRI projects. In their words, ‘Padded project 
costs and high interest rates on project loans may push recipient countries into a debt trap – a 
concern that’s increasingly evident in countries such as Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Myanmar.’70 
As such, India not only defies joining the BRI but also sets the scene for a ‘debt trap diplomacy’ 
narrative as a process of delegitimation of China’s economic leadership. In explaining why 
India would not participate in the BRI forum in Beijing in May 2017, the Indian government 
argued that ‘Connectivity initiatives must follow principles of financial responsibility to avoid 
projects that would create unsustainable debt burden for communities’ (emphasis added).71 
Apart from delegitimizing China’s state capitalism, New Delhi also seeks the opportunity to 
counter China’s regional influence by garnering political support from other like-minded 
liberal democratic powers to contest China’s regional order construction. Deo and Bhandari of 
Gateway House have called on India ‘to work with Japan to provide alternatives, to ensure that 
the region is neither bankrupted nor militarised by Chinese influence.’72  
	
 
Order Contestation: ‘Liberalism’ vs. State Capitalism 
 
In response to China’s BRI inroads into South Asia, India has undertaken its own regional 
order-building project, in partnership with Japan in particular, to undermine the growing power 
and influence of China and its ally, Pakistan.  
 
Vying with China, India has invested $85 million to construct infrastructure in Chabahar port 
in south-eastern Iran, adjacent to Gwadar. In May 2016, New Delhi and Tehran signed an MOU 
to develop a Transit and Transport Corridor among Iran, India and Afghanistan. The major 
purpose of this infrastructure building, including ports, road and rail networks, is to enhance 
the connectivity with landlocked Afghanistan and with the greater Central Asia, with an aim 
of bypassing Pakistan and ending Afghanistan’s dependence on the port of Karachi in Pakistan. 
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The first phase of the Chabahar port was finished at the end of 2017 and India had also sent its 
first shipment of 15,000 tonnes of wheat to Afghanistan through Chabahar. The port was 
formally handed over to India Ports Global Limited (IPGL), a state-owned enterprise, in 
December 2018 and has been fully operational since early 2019.73   
 
India is also actively promoting its presence in the Indian Ocean, apart from Chabahar port. In 
2015, India signed agreements with Mauritius and Seychelles to develop ‘strategic 
infrastructure’ on two islands – Agalega Island in Mauritius and Assumption in Seychelles.74 
Although the agreement with Seychelles encountered domestic opposition in the island state, 
India and Seychelles managed to overcome it and revised the agreement in January 2018, which 
would allow India to build ‘military infrastructure’ in the archipelago.75 To further establish its 
strategic reach in the India Ocean in order to counter China’s presence in the region, New Delhi 
also entered into agreement with Oman, allowing Indian Navy access to the Port of Duqm in 
Oman. Duqm port sits atop of the Indian Ocean and is a crucial waterway to the Persian Gulf.76       
 
To regain India’s position and reverse China’s strategic influence in the region, Indian Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi chose the Maldives and Sri Lanka as his first overseas visits in his 
second term of his premiership in June 2019. During these visits, New Delhi signed a large 
number of memorandums and agreements with Malé, covering hydrography and a coastal radar 
system to strengthen both countries’ surveillance network. Discussion with Sri Lanka also 
centred on security engagements and economic development. Overall, Modi is hoping to offset 
China’s influence by re-establishing India’s long-term military commitment to these countries 
and regain New Delhi’s position in the region.77  
 
Going beyond South Asia, with his ‘Act East’ policy, Modi has further strengthened its 
relations with Japan. Their bilateral relations have been cultivated rapidly as a calculated effort 
to counter-balance China’s influence through its BRI in the region. Modi and Abe 
conceptualized their countries’ bilateral relationship as a ‘Special Strategic and Global 
Partnership’ under a Vision 2025 plan. In their joint statement during Abe’s visit to India in 
December 2015, both vowed that ‘Japan and India, two of the largest and oldest democracies 
in Asia having a high degree of congruence of political, economic and strategic interests, view 
each other as partners that have responsibility for and are capable of responding to global and 
regional challenges’ (emphasis added).78 This overarching India-Japan Vision 2025, Abe’s 
signature Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure initiative and Modi’s ‘Make in India’ 
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initiative and ‘Act East’ policies, have all further forged Indian and Japanese cooperation on 
providing infrastructure projects to developing countries in order to counter the BRI. The Asia-
Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), which aims to link Africa with India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, 
Cambodia and Laos together by sea route, was proposed by India and Japan during the annual 
meeting of the African Development Bank, held in Gujarat, India in May 2017.79  Back in 2007, 
during Abe’s first term as the prime minister of Japan, he conceptualised the idea of ‘the 
confluence of two seas’ in his speech to the Indian Parliament. Ten years on, Abe expanded on 
the concept by connecting ‘two continents’ – Asia and Africa – and ‘two oceans’ – the Indian 
and Pacific Oceans – together through the AAGC.80  The AAGC is often compared with the 
BRI and deemed as a doppelgänger of the ‘String of Pearls’ that the US uses to refer to China’s 
strategy to build ports along the Indian Ocean coast.81  
 
In addition, India is also seeking the opportunity to collaborate with ASEAN countries in 
infrastructure building. In addition to the 1,360-kilometres trilateral highway project among 
India, Myanmar and Thailand, New Delhi is also seeking to extend the connectivity and 
strengthen its trade relationship with the ASEAN countries. The government is considering 
boosting its financial assistance for a highway going from India to Vietnam through Cambodia 
and Laos. On its Republic Day in January 2018, in an unprecedented move, New Delhi invited 
all 10 ASEAN leaders to attend. It was speculated that the Modi government was seeking to 
strengthen its relations with the Southeast Asian bloc amid the growing influence of China in 
the region.82  
 
Liberal Like-Mindedness: The Quad and the Lexicon of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ 
Against this geopolitical background, one may understand the logic behind the revival of the 
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) in 2017. The Quad originated in the response to the 
2004 Boxing Day tsunami along the coasts of most landmasses bordering the Indian Ocean. 
Four democratic powers – Australia, India, Japan and the United States – proposed an informal 
cooperative mechanism to provide military hardware and humanitarian relief to the affected 
areas. 83  This event highlighted the potential maritime cooperation between these four 
democratic states. Japan’s Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, initiated in 2007 to turn this informal 
alliance into a more strategic partnership with a desire to balance the rise of China. This four-
way strategic dialogue was designed to preserve the common interests among the like-minded 
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regional powers, including a liberal rules-based regional order and the maintenance of stability 
in Asia.  
 
The US and Japan used to be the strongest backers of the Quad while India and Australia were 
‘the two weaker links in the Quad chain’.84 Not long after the Quad was established in May 
2007, Australia retreated from it in 2008 for fear that the strategic alliance would affect its 
economic relations with China.85 However, with growing concerns about China’s increasing 
assertiveness in the region and the relative decline of the American power, there is a growing 
nervousness about peace and security in the region. None of the states in Asia could balance 
China’s growing economic and military strength on their own.86 Under this backdrop, the Quad 
was revived in 2017 during Trump’s Asia visit in November of that year. 
 
A new geostrategic term, the ‘Indo-Pacific’, also came of age formally in the year. The US 
unveiled a new American vision based on a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ region. Since then, 
the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ has replaced ‘Asia-Pacific’ as the new lexicon in the policy circles, e.g. 
from the U.S. National Security Strategy to its National Defence Strategy.87 The latter one even 
labelled China as ‘a strategic competitor’ in the Indo-Pacific. In May 2018, the U.S. military 
also announced that its Pacific Command was renamed the Indo-Pacific Command.88 Prior to 
the U.S. adopting this phrase, Australia has also silently retitled its government body and had 
its ‘Asia-Pacific Group’ under the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) renamed 
the ‘Indo-Pacific Group’ in 2017.89  However, India has been behind the promotion of the new 
notion for years.90 As Chengxin Pan has argued, the new concept is not a neutral description, 
but ‘a manufactured super-region designed to hedge against a perceived Sino-centric regional 
order’, and the key actors of the new construct are the US, Australia, Japan and India.91 
 
The revival of the Quad (sometimes referred to as the Quad 2.0) and the lexicon of the ‘Indo-
Pacific’ are due to Chinese expansion in the region and those BRI-related investment activities. 
A common perception among these four democracies is that China poses a challenge to the 
stability of the liberal rules-based order.92 India’s nervousness might even be larger than others 
as China’s controversial BRI activities in Pakistan, the Maldives and Sri Lanka are all 
challenging India’s long-standing dominant position in South Asia. Hence, New Delhi is 
willing to revive the Quad and to hedge against military threats from a rising China to the peace 
and security of the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. India has recently given the green 
 
18 | P a g e  
 
light to upgrading the status of Quad 2.0 meetings to ministerial level. Foreign Ministers of 
Australia, India and Japan and US Secretary of State met on the sidelines of the United Nations 
General Assembly in September 2019. This ‘unprecedented’ meeting was widely reported in 
the Indian press.93 In answering a question about the change in India’s stance raised by The 
Hindu, an Indian newspaper, a US State Department official highlighted the crystallisation of 
‘like-mindedness’ among the four states. He said, ‘There’s recognition that, you know, in the 
past we didn’t have that similar like-minded necessarily among the four partners and over the 




The BRI was originally a strategy designed to enhance China’s security by soft-balancing an 
imminent threat from the US from across the Pacific. It has then evolved into a Eurasian order-
remaking project by spreading Chinese statist norms and rules. While its infrastructure 
investment in South Asia proceeds, the legitimacy of the China model of state capitalism is 
under challenge by India, which has perceived the BRI to be a strategic move to upend the 
status quo and the balance of power in the region, endangering the already strained relations 
between China and India. As shown in this article, India has strategic reasons for being 
concerned over the BRI. The highway of CPEC not only passes through the territories highly 
sensitive to New Delhi, Chinese management of the Gwadar and Jiwani ports has also 
threatened India’s national security. In addition, China’s recent assertiveness in the Indian 
Ocean and its investment activities in the region are perceived by New Delhi as part of its 
encirclement of India by the virtue of ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ with all other South Asian states 
in its near neighbourhood, challenging its traditional leadership in the region. Beijing’s 
infrastructure building has touched a raw nerve with India, which, as a post-colonial state, goes 
to great pains to defend its territorial integrity and both its physical and ontological security. 
 
As a response, India has sought every opportunity to counter China’s regional influence and 
delegitimize its attempts at regional order remaking by establishing the ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ 
narrative. The common thread running through India’s counter-BRI policies, from the AAGC, 
Quad 2.0, and Malabar exercises to its increasing political and economic bonds with ASEAN, 
is to strengthen a liberal order in the Indo-Pacific to counter China’s presence in the region. 
Behind the façade of China and India having established a bilateral ‘strategic partnership’, they 
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compete openly for political and economic influence in the region. China-India relations 
remain as ‘the most competitive relationship between two of the world’s mega-states in the 
twenty-first century’.95 The effectiveness and legitimacy of China’s soft balancing against the 
United States and regional order-remaking largely depends on how China manages its relations 
with its regional arch-rival, India, and whether the latter is willing to acquiesce to, and follow, 
the Chinese rules of the game. This article has, however, demonstrated that shared 
understandings of how regional powers should behave as part of the establishment of the BRI 
in South Asia are absent, and that an order contest between the most powerful states in the 
region, China and India, looms large.  
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